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TRIAL BY MEDIA: THE BETRAYAL 
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S PURPOSE 
GAVIN PHILLIPSON* 
Trial by jury is rapidly being destroyed in America by the manner in which the news-
papers handle all sensational cases.1 
[T]hese defendants were prejudged as guilty and the trial was but a legal gesture to 
register a verdict already dictated by the press and the public opinion which it gener-
ated.2 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
There is continuing concern in the United States about the kind of media 
storms that swirl around high-profile criminal proceedings such as the Sam 
Sheppard case,3 the O.J. Simpson trial,4 or the Duke lacrosse case.5 The knowl-
edge that the transformation of the sober and impartial investigation of guilt 
into a grotesque media “carnival”6 could probably happen nowhere in the 
Western world other than the United States reminds us again of the distinctive-
ness of First Amendment jurisprudence; but the difference in this instance 
seems to arouse more mixed feelings in Americans than usual. As will appear 
below, the pernicious effect of media reportage upon public perceptions of the 
guilt of high-profile defendants,7 with a possible concomitant effect upon the 
fairness of trials, now seems to be fairly widely accepted. 
 
Copyright © 2008 by Gavin Phillipson. 
     This Article is also available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp. 
 * Professor of Law, University of Durham, United Kingdom. An earlier version of this paper was 
presented at The Court of Public Opinion: The Practice and Ethics of Trying Cases in the Media sympo-
sium conference at Duke Law School, September 28–29, 2007. My thanks are due to Francesca Bignami, 
who moderated my panel; Giorgio Resta, for his close and helpful liaison with me in preparing our pa-
pers; and Kathy Bradley for her tireless assistance on all practical arrangements. 
 1. Stewart Perry, The Courts, the Press, and the Public, 30 MICH. L. REV. 228, 234 (1931) (quoting 
trial lawyer Clarence Darrow). 
 2. Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 51 (1951). 
 3. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); see Joanne Brandwood, You Say ‘Fair Trial’ and I 
Say ‘Free Press’: British and American Approaches to Protecting Defendants’ Rights in High Profile Tri-
als, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1412, 1422–24 (2000) (discussing Sheppard’s case); id. at 1426 (on Coleman v. 
Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1985)). 
 4. State v. Simpson, No. BA-097211 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed July 22, 1994). 
 5. See, e.g., Susan Hanley Kosse, Race, Riches & Reporters—Do Race and Class Impact Media 
Rape Narratives? An Analysis of the Duke Lacrosse Case, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 243 (2007). 
 6. See Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 549 (1976) (discussing the impact of excessive me-
dia coverage on the public and the courtroom atmosphere). 
 7. See David A. Sellers, The Circus Comes to Town: The Media and High-Profile Trials, 71 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 181 (Autumn 2008). 
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One practicing, criminal-defense lawyer describes acting for a high-profile 
defendant as akin to entering a “looking-glass world” in which witnesses rou-
tinely sell their stories to the press; “every scrap of . . . evidence, inadmissible or 
not,” is leaked, stolen, or otherwise ferreted out and repeatedly published or 
broadcast;8 blatant and hugely damaging falsehoods are endlessly recycled in 
the news coverage; and “[t]he only consistent winners are those who feed public 
appetites for scandal and profit from the frenzy.”9 Another defense attorney 
speaks from experience of the “insidious degradation of the Sixth Amendment 
rights to a fair trial and jury, created by a commercially-motivated press capital-
izing on the insatiable public appetite for sensational criminal trials.”10 Such ex-
amples look from the outside like a betrayal by the media of the First Amend-
ment’s purpose, as lives and liberties are destroyed in pursuit of stories that sell. 
Meanwhile, the judges look on, too often in denial about the ineffectiveness of 
their attempts to root out bias in their juries, too often mouthing platitudes 
about the vital democratic role the media plays in scrutinizing the criminal-
justice system—even as the media directly attacks its integrity. 
The United States Supreme Court has referred to the right to a fair trial as 
“the most fundamental of all freedoms.”11 But the argument of this paper is that 
U.S. courts must take responsibility for failing to uphold this “fundamental” 
right against the media when other countries have succeeded, or at least have 
done better. The Supreme Court has all but ruled out the most effective way of 
dealing with media prejudice to trials—namely, prior restraint12—and there is 
broad agreement that penal sanctions on the press would likewise fall foul of 
current First Amendment doctrine.13 Much legal discourse in this area seems to 
take the current interpretation of the First Amendment as an unalterable given. 
But the U.S. Constitution itself does not offer any guidance as to how the po-
tential conflict between the media’s right to freedom of expression under the 
First Amendment and the right of defendants to a fair trial under the Sixth 
should be reconciled.14 It has always been open to the Supreme Court to deter-
mine, as it used to, that when the fairness of a trial is actually threatened by me-
dia coverage, then the First Amendment should temporarily defer to the Sixth: 
 
 8. Hal Haddon, Representing a Celebrity Criminal Defendant, 33 LITIG. 19, 19 (2007). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Mark Geragos, The Thirteenth Juror: Media Coverage of Supersized Trials, 39 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1167, 1168 (2006). 
 11. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965). 
 12. See Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (striking down an order for prior restraint 
against the press and creating a heavy presumption against such restrictions on the media). Justice 
Brennan noted the “settled rule of virtually blanket prohibition of prior restraints.” Id. at 594 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring); see also Stephen Krause, Punishing the Press: Using Contempt of Court to Secure 
the Right to a Fair Trial, 76 B.U. L. REV. 537, 559 (1996) (discussing the Court’s rejection of prior re-
straints on the press in Sheppard and Nebraska Press Ass’n); David A. Anderson, Democracy and the 
Demystification of Courts: An Essay, 14 REV. LITIG. 627, 637 (1995) (“The range of circumstances in 
which [prior restraints on the media] might be constitutional is so narrow that sensible judges do not 
even try to impose them.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 12, at 637–39. 
 14. Neb. Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 547. 
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recall the Court’s ringing declaration in Estes v. Texas that “the life or liberty of 
any individual in this land should not be put in jeopardy because of the actions 
of any news media.” 15 
The argument of this article, which draws upon the experiences of other 
countries for illumination, will be as follows: first, that the values underlying 
freedom of speech are not always served by an unrestricted mass media; second, 
that in the instance of speech prejudicial to fair trials, such values support rather 
than oppose restrictions on the media; third, that media coverage can and does 
have a prejudicial effect upon the fairness of trials; and fourth, that neutralizing 
measures designed to counter the effect of prejudicial coverage upon jurors are 
not reliably effective. It will conclude that U.S. courts should reconsider the 
constitutionality of court-ordered restrictions upon prejudicial reporting. As 
what follows will make clear, the third proposition—that media coverage ad-
versely affects the fairness of trials—is widely accepted by commentators, and 
there is some acceptance of the fourth—the ineffectiveness of efforts to amelio-
rate those prejudicial effects. But there is also a great deal of judicial compla-
cency and wishful thinking by commentators, seemingly compelled by the im-
movability of current First Amendment doctrine into thinking that the only 
available responses to media prejudice must work. Most important of all, the 
first two propositions—that free-speech values are under some circumstances 
better served by restricting rather than encouraging an unrestricted media—
seem simply to pass under the radar of much U.S. legal discourse on the fair 
trial–free speech conundrum. In this article, they are drawn into the heart of 
that debate. 
II 
FREE SPEECH, JUSTIFICATIONS, THE MASS MEDIA, AND FAIR TRIALS 
A.  Freedom of Speech and an Unrestrained Media 
The stubborn refusal of participants in most American legal discourse to re-
assess the current approach to the First Amendment in light of the appalling 
misuses of the license it grants to the media looks from the outside like a kind 
of blind faith16—a dogmatic attachment that seems to overlook why society val-
ues free speech in the first place. This refusal to ask whether contemporary me-
dia practice really serves the purposes behind the right to freedom of expression 
risks reducing the First Amendment to a “purposeless abstraction.”17 In the con-
temporary media age, under the pressure of the 24/7 news environment, a 
fiercely competitive mass-media market, and the extraordinary cult of celebrity, 
 
 15. 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965). 
 16. Robert Tsai has recently noted the almost “biblical language” used by the Supreme Court in 
First Amendment cases. See Robert Tsai, Speech and Strife, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 94 
(Summer 2004). 
 17. Cass Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757, 1765 (1995). 
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we should be ready to ask afresh, Does unrestrained media freedom now always 
serve the goals of free speech? The answer given here is an emphatic no: the 
uses the media makes of its freedom can often directly undermine the values 
underlying the right to free speech itself—human dignity, the state’s duty to se-
cure equal respect for the basic rights of all, and the foundations of a democ-
ratic society, among which must be the rule of law, a vital aspect of which is the 
right to a fair trial.18 The converse therefore follows: restricting the media can 
actually uphold these values. Thus, rather than accept an invariable correlation 
between the fundamental values underlying free speech guarantees and the 
value of a free media, we should instead uphold a “variable geometry” of media 
freedom; that is, media expression should receive a varying level of support 
from courts enforcing constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, depend-
ing upon how well the exercise of such freedom serves the ends of free speech 
itself.19 
Thus, although media freedom should be strongly upheld when the media is 
carrying out its proper function in a democracy, when it is not doing so, and par-
ticularly when it is attacking the basic freedoms of others, courts should not 
hesitate to rein it in. As Lichtenberg put it in a seminal article: 
Unlike freedom of speech, to certain aspects of which our commitment must be virtu-
ally unconditional, freedom of the press should be contingent on the degree to which it 
promotes certain values at the core of our interest in freedom of expression generally. 
Freedom of the press, in other words, is an instrumental good: it is good if it does cer-
tain things and not especially good (not good enough to justify special protections, 
anyway) otherwise.20 
The relevance of this insight for the fair trial–free speech debate is evident 
in the following brief survey of free-speech theory. 
B.  Free-Speech Justifications, the Media, and Prejudicial Speech 
One of the most attractive contemporary defenses of freedom of speech is 
Ronald Dworkin’s argument from moral autonomy: based upon the founda-
tional principle that governments must treat all citizens with equal concern and 
respect, it supports the right to freedom of speech in order to prevent unpopu-
lar points of view from being silenced because state actors or majorities find 
them distasteful or offensive. 21 This notion has been judicially described as “a 
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment.”22 However, when speech is 
restrained in order to protect the fairness of a trial, the state is not acting from 
 
 18. This question is raised and answered in HELEN FENWICK & GAVIN PHILLIPSON, MEDIA 
FREEDOM UNDER THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 20–32 (2006). 
 19. Id. at 27–29. As Judith Lichtenberg puts it, “[C]onsiderations internal to the theory of free 
speech itself may provide reasons for limiting freedom of the press.” Judith Lichtenberg, Foundations 
and Limits of Freedom of the Press, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 329, 333 (1987). 
 20. Lichtenberg, supra note 19, at 332 (emphasis added). 
 21. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Do We Have a Right to Pornography?, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 
335 (1985); Ronald Dworkin, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 82-130 (1977). 
 22. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 
(1994). 
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such an illegitimate motive: a prohibition upon the reporting of highly prejudi-
cial facts, such as previous convictions or confessions, is not premised upon 
governmental dislike or contempt for certain viewpoints, nor is it an attempt to 
suppress the development of certain ideologies, or to deprive the citizen of in-
formation about the justice system generally. Instead, restraint has the legiti-
mate aim of protecting another individual constitutional right—the right to a 
fair trial under the Sixth Amendment. Such restrictions do not infringe the basic 
principle underlying the right to free speech: “[For] if the fair trial of an indi-
vidual is arbitrarily affected by media coverage, since that individual is accused 
of a crime which happens to have caught public attention, the state has failed to 
secure equal access to justice.”23 Therefore, the very rationale underpinning free 
speech in this case requires some restriction of the media. 
Much the same may be said for what is “the most influential theory in the 
development of 20th century free-speech law,”24 namely, the argument based on 
self-government, or democracy. The argument, expounded most forcibly by 
Alexander Meiklejohn,25 is that citizens cannot participate fully in a democracy 
unless they have a reasonable understanding of political issues; therefore, open 
debate and a free flow of information on such matters is essential. Plainly, this 
rationale strongly protects the media, and through it, public scrutiny of the jus-
tice system, an essential component of any democratic society.26 Indeed, the ar-
guments for open justice are so strong partly because they draw upon both clas-
sical free-speech arguments—particularly the self-government rationale—and 
upon those arguments associated with the right to a fair trial. The criminal-
justice system, so vital to the rule of law and to the liberty of citizens in a free 
society, requires the “disinfectant”27 of public scrutiny and discussion of its 
workings in order to ensure its proper functioning. As the Supreme Court put it 
in Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, “Commentary and reporting on the criminal 
justice system is at the core of First Amendment values . . . .”28 
Too often the argument stops here. But it can and should be taken a further 
step: precisely because it is the arguments from democracy and fair trial that are 
used to support media freedom to comment on criminal-justice matters, speech 
that threatens the fairness of trials and thus undermines a central premise of 
any democracy—the rule of law—must by the same token, be seen as unsup-
ported by the same arguments by which it is generally underpinned. The result, 
then, is that such speech can properly be subject to well-directed and propor-
tionate regulation designed to safeguard the fairness of trials. 
 
 23. FENWICK & PHILLIPSON, supra note 18, at 173 (emphasis added). 
 24. ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 20 (2d ed. 2005). 
 25. See, e.g., Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245 
(1961). 
 26. See, e.g., IAN CRAM, A VIRTUE LESS CLOISTERED: COURTS, SPEECH AND CONSTITUTIONS 
10–11 (2002). 
 27. R v. Shayler, [2003] EWCA (Crim) 2218, [21], [2003] 1 A.C. 247, [21] (Eng.). 
 28. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976). 
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The point is illuminated by examining some well-known dicta of Justice 
Brennan on this subject: “Public scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality 
and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process, with benefits to both the 
defendant and society as a whole. . . . [It] fosters an appearance of fairness, the-
reby heightening public respect for the judicial process.”29 All this is true in the-
ory, and when carried out by a responsible media with respect for the fairness of 
trials, it is true in practice also. The crucial point, however, is that when media 
coverage is prejudicial, as it often is, each of the valuable purposes enumerated 
by Justice Brennan is in fact undermined. If the jury is rendered biased by in-
flammatory reporting, the “integrity of the . . . process”30 is severely weakened, 
and miscarriages of justice may occur; the public will not see an “appearance of 
fairness”31 when the defendant’s guilt, including details of inadmissible evidence, 
is daily proclaimed in the media; its “respect for the judicial process”32 cannot 
but be gravely undermined when guilty verdicts are overturned on a subsequent 
finding that a fair trial did not take place. What Justice Brennan’s dicta does not 
grasp is the damage arguably done to the judicial system and public confidence 
in it when this happens: justice is denied to victims of crime, and possibly guilty 
and dangerous people are allowed to walk free, while it is publicly acknowl-
edged that the justice system unfairly condemned a fellow citizen and (in many 
cases) deprived him of his liberty as a result. 
C.  Recognizing Prejudicial Speech as “Low-Value” Speech 
Greater recognition of these arguments would lead to judicial reconsidera-
tion of something completely missing from the judgments at present: the ques-
tion whether speech in the media that directly attacks the fairness of trials is 
worthy of protection. The stance taken in cases like Nebraska Press Ass’n v. 
Stuart33 is simply that prior restraint is the most dangerous attack upon free 
speech and, constitutionally, virtually impossible to justify. However, one surely 
cannot meaningfully assess how pernicious prior restraint is in a particular case 
without some attempt at assessing the value or importance of the type of speech 
being restrained. Let us imagine, for example, that a court was being urged to 
prohibit the screening of a graphic pornographic film portraying the rape of 
young children in a way designed to arouse individuals with pedophilic tenden-
cies. It would surely be unrealistic for the discussion to assess whether the 
threatened harm to society was sufficiently substantial to justify overriding the 
general prohibition on prior restraint without also considering the value of the 
category of expression being restrained. 
To assess certain speech as “low value” does not, as Cass Sunstein has so 
persuasively argued, imply that one thereby hands a general license to govern-
 
 29. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
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ment to suppress or interfere with it.34 Indeed, “[i]t is impossible to develop a 
system of free expression without making distinctions between low and high 
value speech, however difficult . . . that task may be.”35 This is principally be-
cause, without such a distinction, “government will be unable to control [speech 
such as conspiracies, child pornography, and malicious private libel] without si-
multaneously lowering the burden of justification [for interfering with speech 
generally] and thus endangering other speech that belongs at the center of con-
stitutional concern.”36 
If judges were to recognize prejudicial speech as “low value,”37 they would 
be readier to restrict it. The problem is that courts seem presently to be blind-
sided by the dazzle of the open-justice principle: the notion of robust and unin-
hibited reportage on the criminal-justice system carries with it such compelling 
overtones of a high and righteous purpose that judges seem to shy away from 
looking more closely at the type of prejudicial media expression discussed here 
and from recognizing it for what it is: low-value speech. This can be seen very 
clearly in a related area of law in the notorious decision in Florida Star v. B.J.F.38 
The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment protected a newspaper 
from civil action for its revelation of a rape victim’s name, resulting in her fur-
ther terrorization by her assailant, since “the commission, and investigation, of 
[rape]”39 were “matter[s] of paramount public import.”40 The glaring omission in 
this case was the complete absence of any attempt to ask just how and why pub-
lic understanding of the criminal-justice system was served by its being in-
formed of the name and address of a particular rape victim—in other words, by 
the particular news report in question. In this way, First Amendment rights are 
painted with so broad and imprecise a brush that other rights—personal pri-
vacy, fair trial—are simply overwhelmed. 
D.  Judicial Reasoning: The De Facto Sacrifice of the Sixth to the First 
Amendment 
There is a separate and narrower ground upon which the current judicial 
approach in this area may be criticized: at present, the manner in which cases 
are reasoned effectively—but illegitimately—privileges the First Amendment 
over the Sixth, judicial denials notwithstanding.41 In the Nebraska Press Ass’n 
 
 34. Cass Sunstein, Low Value Speech Revisited, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 555, 556–57 (1989). 
 35. Id. at 557. 
 36. Id. at 561. 
 37. So the Supreme Court regarded sexually explicit speech in Young v. American Mini Theatres, 
Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). Justice Stevens, giving the judgment of the court, said: “[T]here is surely a less 
vital interest in the uninhibited exhibition of material that is on the borderline between pornography 
and artistic expression than in the free dissemination of ideas of social and political significance.” Id. at 
61. 
 38. 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
 39. Id. at 537. 
 40. Id. at 536–37. 
 41. For an example of the Supreme Court’s repudiation of the idea that the First Amendment is 
privileged over the Sixth Amendment, see Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976). 
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decision, for example, one of the key reasons for overturning the publication 
ban imposed by the trial court was that it had not been conclusively demon-
strated that other methods of protecting the trial would be inadequate;42 nor had 
it been proved that the trial would definitely be seriously prejudiced without the 
ban. What, then, is the effect of this reasoning? Notionally, the First and Sixth 
Amendments start on the same level.43 As the rights of those affected are played 
out, the exercise of each right may diminish or damage the enjoyment of the 
other. In theory, therefore, U.S. courts could start by assuming the parity of the 
two rights and require each party to advance arguments as to why, in a particu-
lar case, its right should have priority. But in practice, the reasoning places the 
entire burden of justification—an insupportable burden in fact—on the party 
seeking to restrain the press. It is simply assumed that the media should always 
be free, even when their actions threaten Sixth Amendment rights, and they are 
never called upon to justify their prejudicial speech. In terms of the way the 
case is reasoned, therefore, the First Amendment is subtly but unequivocally 
prioritized. 
 
 42. Id. at 565. 
 43. One First Amendment scholar has argued that the Sixth Amendment is irrelevant in such situa-
tions because it does not apply to the press. See Hans A. Linde, Fair Trials and Press Freedom—Two 
Rights Against the State, 13 WILLAMETTE L.J. 211 (1977). This argument relies on the “state action” 
doctrine, whereby federal courts cannot enforce constitutional rights against private parties. But as 
Stephen Gardbaum has recently argued, this argument is crucially undermined by a failure to draw a 
vital distinction between what European lawyers term “direct” and “indirect horizontal effects.” See 
Stephen Gardbaum, The “Horizontal Effect” of Constitutional Rights, 102 MICH. L. REV. 387, 388–91 
(2003). Direct horizontal effect signifies the ability of one individual to sue another directly for breach 
of a constitutional right. Indirect horizontal effect, in contrast, signifies a duty upon courts to ensure 
that in their development and application of existing law governing relations between private parties, 
they ensure that is in conformity with constitutional values. The U.S. Constitution clearly rules out di-
rect horizontal effect, so that one individual cannot sue another for breach of constitutional rights. But 
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, art. VI, § 1, cl. 2, means that it applies to all law, which must 
be compatible with it. Gardbaum, supra, at 418–19. Hence, in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964), the Court changed the law of private libel so that, even in the context of private litigation, the 
press’s First Amendment rights were protected. In effect, therefore, the court enforced the First 
Amendment against a private litigant: Sullivan’s private-law rights were limited by the court in order to 
uphold the free-speech guarantee. So it could be with the Sixth Amendment: individuals clearly cannot 
sue the press for breaching their Sixth Amendment rights, since the press are not bound to uphold 
them. But the courts are. Thus, in hearing an application to grant a gag order against the media, courts 
are just as much bound to uphold Sixth Amendment rights as they are the First. Therefore, courts in 
such situations are engaged in balancing competing constitutional rights. While it is true that in Sullivan 
the court was merely refraining from granting an award of damages on the basis that this would consti-
tute an undue restriction upon First Amendment rights, whereas in the example of restraining pretrial 
publicity, courts would be affirmatively gagging the press, this is a distinction without a difference. Ei-
ther the Bill of Rights is irrelevant in private litigation or it is not. There is no justification for applying 
some constitutional rights in private law and not others. Indirect horizontal effect of all relevant consti-
tutional rights, as described above, is the approach adopted in other countries: for the position in Can-
ada, see Retail Wholesale and Dep’t Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 
573; for that of the South African Constitutional Court on the horizontal effect of human rights under 
the Interim Constitution, see Du Plessis & Others v. De Klerk & Another 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) at [30]–
[66]; for the U.K. position, see Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22, [132], [2004] 2 W.L.R. 1232, 
[132] (appeal taken from Eng.). For detailed discussion of Campbell and other U.K. decisions on this 
point, see Gavin Phillipson, Clarity Postponed: Horizontal Effect after Campbell, in HELEN FENWICK, 
GAVIN PHILLIPSON & ROGER MASTERMAN, JUDICIAL REASONING UNDER THE UK HUMAN RIGHTS 
ACT 143 (2007). 
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The counterargument, of course, is that because there are other ways of 
safeguarding the Sixth Amendment right to fair trials—jury challenges, change 
of venue, and so on—which do not require interferences with free speech in the 
media, using such methods protects both rights and is therefore the plainly pref-
erable approach. The counterargument depends, however, upon its being clear 
that those other methods do reliably safeguard fair trials. If, in fact, there are 
doubts as to whether they do work—and the discussion below suggests that 
there are very serious doubts—then the current, absolute protection of First 
Amendment rights is, at the very least, putting at risk the right to a fair trial. 
Therefore, rather than assuming that they must not restrict the media unless 
other methods relied upon to protect fair trials are proven ineffective, courts 
should take both rights as being prima facie at risk when deciding whether to 
restrict reporting of trials; that is, in principle, courts should be prepared to re-
strict either right as seems necessary in the particular circumstances in order to 
protect the other. The result would be that in certain cases, in which serious 
prejudice seemed highly likely and there were good grounds to be doubtful 
about the efficacy of other measures, narrowly tailored publication bans could 
be considered. 
The point is well illustrated by the dissenting judgment of Justice Gonthier 
in the leading Canadian judgment on fair trials, contempt, and free speech, 
Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.,44 setting out an alternative approach 
to balancing these two rights: 
[E]ach party bears an initial burden of showing a Charter [of Rights] infringement. Af-
ter that initial burden is discharged, . . . the balancing of competing Charter rights is 
incompatible with a burden on either party. Burdens are simply means of allocating 
uncertainty. It is appropriate in a normal [proportionality] analysis to place the burden 
on the government because it is required to justify legislation or action which infringes 
a single Charter right. Burdens are completely inappropriate where a prima facie case 
has been made out that the alternative courses of action (i.e., to issue a ban or not) 
will infringe two different Charter rights. . . . [T]he balancing . . . at the heart of the 
[proportionality] analysis should be carried on without privileging or disadvantaging 
either of the rights at issue.45 
The U.S. courts are accustomed to scrutinizing state action in contravention 
of constitutional rights; what has happened in cases like Nebraska Press Ass’n is 
that they are applying the same test when another individual right is at stake, 
thus in effect depriving that right of equal status with speech rights. What is re-
quired instead is the kind of sensitive balancing advocated by Justice Gonthier 
and undertaken by English courts when balancing the two conflicting rights of 
privacy and free speech. As Lord Steyn put it in In re S (A child): 
First, neither [right] has as such precedence over the other. Secondly, where the values 
under the two [rights] are in conflict, an intense focus on the comparative importance 
of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case is necessary. Thirdly, the jus-
 
 44. [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835. 
 45. Id. at 922 (Gonthier, J., dissenting). 
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tifications for interfering with or restricting each right must be taken into account. Fi-
nally, the proportionality test must be applied to each. 46 
E.  Comparative Perspectives 
The English approach forms a strong contrast to that in the United States. 
Although valuing free speech as a vital aspect of a healthy democracy and an 
important individual right,47 the English courts and Parliament have made it 
clear that such freedom does not extend to the prejudicing of trials. Thus, once 
a suspect has been charged or arrested, the Contempt of Court Act of 198148 is 
activated: publication of material that creates a substantial risk of serious preju-
dice to the forthcoming proceedings49 is a criminal offense.50 Exceptionally, prior 
restraint may also be used.51 This is in harmony with the approach of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, as Professor Resta’s paper in this 
symposium illustrates.52 There is indeed a fairly widespread consensus outside 
the United States that in certain cases some restriction of the press may be both 
legitimate and necessary in order to protect the presumption of innocence.53 
One should not succumb to Anglo-complacency on this subject. The cogent 
criticisms that can be directed at the design of English contempt law and its op-
eration in practice are well known. Critics persuasively argue that the English 
approach is both over- and under-inclusive—failing always to deter prejudicial 
speech,54 while striking too widely in scope.55 Moreover, other protective meas-
 
 46. [2004] UKHL 47, [2005] 1 A.C. 593, 603 (appeal taken from Eng.); see also Campbell, [2004] 
UKHL 22 at [55]. In each of these cases, the House of Lords sought to ensure that each party’s rights—
to free speech and privacy, respectively—were limited only to the extent necessary to ensure as full en-
joyment as possible of the other right. 
 47. See, e.g., R v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t ex parte Simms, [2000] 2 A.C. 115, 125 (H.L.) 
(appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (opinion of Lord Steyn). 
 48. Contempt of Court Act, 1981, c. 49, § 2(3), sched. 1 (defining the point in a criminal investiga-
tion at which the provisions of the statute are activated). 
 49. This is the test set out in Contempt of Court Act § 2(2). See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. MGN Ltd., 
(1997) 1 All E.R. 456 (Eng.) (considering and applying the test). 
 50. Freedom to comment on forthcoming trials as a way of raising broader issues is preserved by 
Contempt of Court Act § 5: a good-faith discussion of public affairs will not incur liability when refer-
ence to the trial is only incidental to the main thrust of the article. 
 51. Contempt of Court Act, 1981, c. 49, § 4(2). Broad powers to issue injunctions arise from the 
Supreme Court Act, 1981, c. 54, §§ 37(1), 45(4). See also Ex parte HTV Cymru (Wales) Ltd., [2002] 
E.M.L.R. 11, 50 (considering and applying this provision). 
 52. Giorgio Resta, Trying Cases in the Media: A Comparative Overview, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 31 (Autumn 2008). 
 53. The leading decisions in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are all characterized by a rejec-
tion of the U.S. approach. See Dagenais v. Canadian Broad. Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, [73] (Can.); 
Gisborne Herald Co. v. Solicitor-Gen., [1995] 3 N.Z.L.R. 563 (C.A.); Hinch v. A-G (Vict.) (1987) 164 
C.L.R. 15. The article by Professor Resta in this symposium deals with the approach of a number of 
European jurisdictions and of the European Court of Human Rights: all contrast sharply with that of 
the United States. See Resta, supra note 52. 
 54. FENWICK & PHILLIPSON, supra note 18, at 252–57. 
 55. Cram, supra note 26, is particularly critical. For an argument that narrowly tailored prior re-
straints would be preferable to post-trial criminal sanctions, see FENWICK & PHILLIPSON, supra note 
18, at 216–23, 303–10. 
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ures, such as the jury challenge, are undoubtedly underused by English courts.56 
There are also well-founded concerns about the efficacy of bans applying to the 
U.K. media in the age of the Internet, when bloggers based abroad and easy ac-
cess to U.S. newspapers online may allow British jurors access to prejudicial 
material, even when the main U.K. media organs do not publish it.57 It is readily 
conceded that, in a particular case, this point may well raise questions as to 
whether an order restraining reporting should be made; but what it does not do 
is justify ruling out in advance the possibility of controls on the media. In many 
cases, reporting bans would still radically decrease the likelihood of jurors en-
countering prejudicial material and thus substantially increase the possibility of 
empanelling an unbiased jury and achieving a fair trial. 
III 
NEUTRALIZING MEASURES AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS 
It is necessary now to examine the effectiveness of the other methods of 
safeguarding trials, which, it is claimed, render restrictions upon the media un-
necessary and thus restrictions upon media freedoms disproportionate. Do 
these neutralizing methods—relied upon so heavily by American courts—
reliably work? An unbiased reading of the available research suggests other-
wise.58 A crucial point is that it is not so much expressions of opinion, but revela-
tions of fact—particularly inadmissible evidence—that are really damaging. 
One attorney notes the press’s belief that “it has a First Amendment right to 
access and publish every scrap of potential evidence, inadmissible or not, well 
before trial.”59 And it is just the dissemination of such material that causes the 
most serious damage to the presumption of innocence. As two leading U.S. 
commentators have put it, “The greatest danger to fair trial in a jury case arises 
when the Press publishes evidence not admissible at the trial, such as a coerced 
confession or the defendant’s criminal record.”60 Another summarizes the U.S. 
research as finding that “revelations of prior convictions, [and] recanted [or 
other inadmissible] confessions create a . . . persistent bias in the minds of pro-
spective jurors.”61 In one study, “more than 72% of jurors exposed to . . . stories 
containing inadmissible evidence voted to convict, whereas less than 44% of 
voters not exposed . . . [did so].”62 
 
 56. For examples of such arguments, see sources cited by Brandwood, supra note 3, at 1443, and 
the “Anglo-Canadian” approach suggested by Justice Gonthier for the Canadian Supreme Court in 
Dagenais, [1994] 3 S.C.R. at 932 (opinion of Gonthier, J.). 
 57. See, e.g., Brandwood, supra note 3, at 1440–41. 
 58. Only a brief summary can be included here due to space constraints. 
 59. Haddon, supra note 8, at 23. 
 60. Richard Donnelly & Ronald Goldfarb, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 24 MOD. 
L. REV. 239, 245 (1961). 
 61. Brandwood, supra note 3, at 1418; see also id. nn. 28–33 (citing research supporting this conclu-
sion). 
 62. Christina Studebaker & Steven Penrod, Pretrial Publicity: the Media, the Law and Common 
Sense, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 428, 433 (1997). 
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It would seem remarkable for anyone to contest these findings as to the ef-
fect of such evidence on a jury: it is the very reason for rendering previous con-
victions generally inadmissible and for the strict rules all democracies have gov-
erning police conduct and the obtaining of confessions. One high-profile 
attorney has remarked: “I have tried cases where material was excluded from 
evidence because it was too prejudicial for the jury to hear, only to have the 
same material broadcast and printed so often that the jurors later actually 
thought it was presented as evidence.”63 The U.S. judiciary has shown some rec-
ognition of this problem. In Marshall v. United States, the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that “prejudice to the defendant is almost certain to be as great” 
when inadmissible evidence is published in the media as when introduced by 
the prosecution.64 However, this principle is confined to federal trials;65 mystify-
ingly, the Supreme Court has refused to extend Marshall to state trials,66 and 
there are spectacular examples of judicial denial on this issue.67  
Such media behavior can not only produce a substantial risk of prejudicing 
the trial, but it attacks the rule of law more directly. The Supreme Court has it-
self noted that “the exclusion of such evidence in court is rendered meaningless 
when news media make it available to the public.”68 Barendt summarizes Fre-
derick Schauer’s argument on this point: “[N]o lawyer has the right to evade the 
rules of evidence and procedure carefully designed to produce a fair trial by 
holding a press conference at which he leaks to the media the inadmissible evi-
dence. It is hard to see why the media should have such a right.”69 To put it 
more bluntly, such a practice makes “a nonsense of the rules of evidence.”70 
What, then, as to the efficacy of neutralizing measures? Belief in their effec-
tiveness is complacent—and such complacency is particularly strong amongst 
the judges, many of whom appear to be unaware of the empirical research in 
the area, and have an exaggerated faith in their own ability to neutralize, 
through jury instructions, any prejudice in the jury resulting from media cover-
age71 (if indeed any risk of prejudice is acknowledged at all). Thus, one com-
mentator remarks that, “despite strong . . . evidence to the contrary, many 
 
 63. Geragos, supra note 10, at 1177. 
 64. 360 U.S. 310, 312–13 (1959). 
 65. Brandwood, supra note 3, at 1428. 
 66. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975) (affirming a district court’s denial of plaintiff’s habeas 
corpus relief to overturn his conviction on account of prejudicial pretrial publicity). 
 67. See, e.g., Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984). In Patton, the Court held that widespread pre-
trial adverse publicity and community outrage about the crime did not jeopardize the fairness of the 
defendant’s trial. The jury was presumed to be impartial, even though most potential jurors questioned 
on voir dire remembered the unfavorable publicity and admitted they would be unable to set aside the 
opinions they had formed. 
 68. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 360 (1966). 
 69. BARENDT, supra note 24, at 322 (summarizing Frederick Schauer, The Speech of Law and the 
Law of Speech, 49 ARK. L. REV. 687, 692–94 (1997)). 
 70. Id. 
 71. For a particularly blatant example, see Dagenais v. Canadian Broad. Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, 
878–81 (Can.) (opinion of Lamer, C.J.) (citing none of the published evidence and relying solely on ex-
pressions of confidence as to the efficacy of admonishment made by judges in other cases). 
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American judges doubt that publicity can prejudice criminal trials.”72 Justice 
Brennan in Nebraska Press Ass’n refers to “adequate devices” for identifying 
and excluding biased jurors,73 placing great weight on the efficacy of questioning 
jurors as to their exposure to pretrial publicity and its effects on them. Admon-
ishment to disregard is still relied upon, despite its being the least effective 
method of correcting such effects, as the published research indicates.74 Perhaps 
this judicial wishful thinking reflects the basic dilemma of American judges: 
Courts are unable to seriously consider gagging the media but equally unable to 
admit they are thereby putting at risk the administration of justice, their par-
ticular area of constitutional responsibility. In such a situation the obvious judi-
cial temptation is to allow the desire to believe that existing remedies must be 
effective to convince judges that they really are: thus wishful thinking replaces 
evidence.75 
What, then, about the efficacy of remedies other than admonishment? Se-
questrations take place very rarely, are expensive, place “monstrous” burdens 
on jurors,76 particularly in long trials, risking “breed[ing] jury resentment [and 
thus] anti-defendant bias,” and moreover can do nothing about the effects of 
pretrial publicity.77 Delay of the trial is doubly unsatisfactory: it renders trials 
less likely to do justice, with the fading of relevant events from witnesses’ 
memories, and it is also contrary to the guarantee of a prompt trial in the Sixth 
Amendment,78 something acknowledged in Justice Brennan’s concurrence in 
Nebraska Press Ass’n.79 Change of venue, in response to prejudicial coverage in 
a particular area, may no longer be effective in the age of the Internet, when 
newspapers keep archives of back issues obtainable online. Nor will it assist 
when the prejudicial publicity was carried by national newspapers or television 
stations. Moreover, change of venue is “very unpopular with trial courts” and so 
 
 72. Brandwood, supra note 3, at 1416 (citing Studebaker & Penrod, supra note 62, at 433 (social-
science evidence) and Robert Drechsel, An Alternative View of Media–Judiciary Relations: What the 
Non-Legal Evidence Suggests About the Fair Trial–Free Press Issue, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 16 (1989) 
(views of the judges)). Brandwood also cites Joseph Mariniello, Note, The Death Penalty and Pre-Trial 
Publicity: Are Today’s Attempts at Guaranteeing a Fair Trial Adequate?, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 371, 387 (1994) on this point. Id. at 1417 n.24. 
 73. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 601 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 74. For examples of research indicating the ineffectiveness of jury instructions, see Geoffrey P. 
Kramer, Norbert L. Kerr & John S. Carroll, Pretrial Publicity, Judicial Remedies and Jury Bias, 14 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 409, 430–35 (1990); Newton Minow & Fred Cate, Who is an Impartial Juror in an Age 
of Mass Media?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 631, 648 & n.109; see also T. M. Honess, Empirical and Legal Per-
spectives on the Impact of Pre-Trial Publicity, CRIM. L. REV. 719, 723 (2002) (citing S.M. Kassin & C.A. 
Studebaker, Instructions to Disregard and the Jury: Curative and Paradoxical Effects, in INTENTIONAL 
FORGETTING: INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES (Jonathan M. Golding & Colin M. MacLeod eds., 
1998)). See also Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The 
naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury . . . all practicing 
lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.”). 
 75. As Minow & Cate, supra note 74, put it: “courts, perhaps believing that no other alternatives 
exist, continue to rely on these inadequate remedies.” Id. at 654. 
 76. See R v. Keegstra (No. 2) (1992) 127 A.R. 232, 235 (Can.)(opinion of Kerans, J.A.). 
 77. Krause, supra note 12, at 565. 
 78. BARENDT, supra note 24, at 332. 
 79. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 602 n.28 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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“rarely grant[ed].”80 Finally, when a case attracts sustained national coverage, it 
may be difficult or impossible to find jurors who have not encountered the cov-
erage.81 
Questioning jurors as to whether they are prejudiced is not to be counted on 
either: research has found that jurors cannot reliably assess their own degree of 
prejudice or may not be honest when questioned about it.82 There is also evi-
dence of “stealth jurors,” who deliberately seek a seat in high-profile trials in 
order to convict someone they believe guilty, or in the hope of financial gain 
from the media, or simply to participate in a “celebrity” occasion.83 One promi-
nent defense attorney concludes that “these solutions (voir dire, change of 
venue, and so on) are no longer feasible in [high-profile] cases.”84 In any event, 
the Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutional right for the defense 
to question individual jurors as to possible bias.85 
Another possible solution to counter the effect of media bias on jurors is to 
issue court orders restraining attorneys and others from giving information to 
the press. However, given that many leaks to the press are anonymous and that 
generally the media cannot be required to disclose its sources,86 it is unlikely 
that these measures can be effective.87 There remain the final resorts of aban-
doning the trial or overturning the conviction on appeal. Aside from the fact 
that such reversals are “incredibly difficult” to obtain,88 this approach denies the 
victims justice, risks allowing guilty and sometimes dangerous persons to go 
free, and undermines public confidence in the criminal-justice system—scarcely 
a satisfactory result. Moreover, by the time a verdict is overturned on appeal, 
the defendant may have been incarcerated for a substantial period of time, lost 
his job, suffered family break-up, and generally had his life pretty thoroughly 
torn apart.89 As one survey bluntly concludes, “None of these [neutralizing 
measures] is satisfactory.”90 
 
 80. Krause, supra note 12, at 566. 
 81. See also O’Mara v. Commonwealth, 75 Pa. 424, 428 (1874) (noting that the spread of informa-
tion in society makes it unlikely that potential jurors will have formed no opinion whatsoever, for 
“every remarkable event of today is known all over the country to-morrow”). 
 82. Minow & Cate, supra note 74, at 650; Krause, supra note 12, at 568–69 & n.256. 
 83. For a discussion of stealth jurors, see Geragos, supra note 10, at 1188–89. 
 84. Id. at 1172. 
 85. Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 424–45 (1991); see also Alfredo Garcia, Clash of the Titans: 
The Difficult Resolution of a Fair Trial and Free Press in Modern American Society, 32 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 1107, 1129 (1992) (contending that “[t]he effect of Mu’Min is to leave a criminal defendant vir-
tually powerless in the quest to select an impartial jury”). 
 86. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691 (1972) (acknowledging that a vast majority of 
reporter–source relationships remains confidential and immune from grand-jury subpoena power). 
 87. For discussions of why gag orders may be ineffective, see Krause, supra note 12, at 566–67 & 
n.246; Geragos, supra note 10, at 1183; Anderson, supra note 12, at 635–36. 
 88. Brandwood, supra note 3, at 1421, 1426. 
 89. The same happened to Sam Sheppard: when his conviction was eventually overturned he had 
spent more than ten years in prison. Sheppard then “lost his medical license, became an alcoholic, and 
died within four years of his acquittal at the age of forty-six.” Id. at 1423. 
 90. Donnelly & Goldfarb, supra note 60, at 245. 
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IV 
CONCLUSION 
U.S. courts should reconsider the possibility of imposing narrowly tailored 
prohibitions on publishing inadmissible evidence, including prior convictions 
and other seriously prejudicial material, shortly before and during the trial.91 
Not only would this be solidly supported by the published research by prohibit-
ing only reporting that has been found to be the most damaging to fair trials, it 
would only bite upon reportage that, since it constitutes an irresponsible attack 
upon the rights of the individual, should be seen as “low-value” and thus open 
to regulation. Such bans would enhance U.S. democracy by strengthening the 
practical implementation of the rule of law and would not represent a govern-
mental attack upon particular groups or points of view. Moreover, even publica-
tion of material caught by the order would be only delayed until the conclusion 
of the trial, not prohibited altogether. Bans could be sparingly used, in conjunc-
tion with the other methods discussed above. 
Perhaps the final observation may be a more impressionistic one. The spec-
tacle of the persistent refusal of U.S. courts to protect individuals from the 
prejudicial effect of media coverage of their arrest and trials by restraining the 
media looks from outside the United States like the very opposite of American 
respect for the individual and reverence for individual liberty. Rather, it ap-
pears that the rights and freedoms of individuals are being sacrificed to the 
commercial interests of the mass media and the idle curiosity of the majority. 
Cases in which a media pack fuels sales by consuming an individual’s life and 
reputation, threatening a miscarriage of justice in the process, cannot without 
perversity be characterized as the exercise of a vital human right to free 
speech—or at least not without utterly surrendering the content and meaning of 
that right to powerful commercial and corporate forces of a kind that John Stu-
art Mill, with his famous defense of human liberty, never envisaged dominating 
the so-called marketplace of ideas.92 As Jeff Fager, executive producer of 60 
Minutes, said of the Duke lacrosse case: “There’s something that goes against 
the American way when a pack rules.”93 A shift from protecting the pack to pro-
tecting the individual, by more surely protecting the fairness of trials, would not 
betray human liberty, or the U.S. Constitution, but vindicate both. 
 
 
 91. U.S. courts could adapt the “active period” used in English law. See supra text accompanying 
note 48. 
 92. John Stuart Mill, Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER 
ESSAYS 33 (2d ed. 1863). 
 93. Rachel Smolkin, Justice Delayed, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Aug.–Sept. 2007, at 18, 28 (on file 
with Law and Contemporary Problems), available at http://www.ajr.org/article.asp?id=4379. 
